

THE ANALYTIC SCIENCES CORPORATION

SP-1352-4

SHIP POINT DEFENSE WEAPON SCHEDULING

23 April 1981

Prepared for:

NAVAL SURFACE WEAPON CENTER/DAHLGREN LABORATORY
Department of the Navy
Dahlgren, Virginia

WEAPON SCHEDULING BRIEFING OVERVIEW

R-70925


- PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
- ASSUMED SHIP CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
- WEAPON SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS
- PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS FOR REALISTIC SCENARIOS
- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

R-70928

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

PROBLEM: DEFEND SHIP AGAINST ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE (ASCM) ATTACK

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- MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS ASCM ATTACKS ANTICIPATED
- SCHEDULE ASSETS FOR HARD KILL USING MISSILES AND GUNS

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PROGRAM OVERVIEW

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- **GOAL:** DEVELOP WEAPON SCHEDULING METHODS FOR SHIP POINT DEFENSE AGAINST

ASCM THREATS

ASCM LAUNCH PLATFORMS

- **ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

DEVELOPED AND COMPARED THREE SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS, ONE BASED ON AN OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUE.

ASSESSED ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE AGAINST THREATS AND PLATFORMS IN REALISTIC SCENARIOS.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

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ALTHOUGH DIFFERENT SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS SOMETIMES GIVE IDENTICAL RESULTS, AN OPTIMIZED ALGORITHM CAN SIGNICANTLY ENHANCE SHIP SURVIVAL IN STRESSFUL SCENARIOS.

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ASSUMED SHIP CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

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POINT DEFENSE ASSETS

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- MODERN INTEGRATED SEARCH/TRACK RADAR
UNLIMITED TRACK CAPACITY
RANGE LIMITED TO 60,000 FT AGAINST SEASKIMMER ASCMs


- HARD KILL WEAPONS*
ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) MISSILES
POINT DEFENSE GUNS (PDGs) FOR INNER DEFENSE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE WARFARE (SSW) CRUISE MISSILES AGAINST
SURFACE PLATFORMS

- WEAPON SYSTEM FEATURES
AAW MISSILES LAUNCHED WITH FIELD-OF-FIRE LIMITATIONS AND
RELOAD/SLEW TIME DELAYS
INNER DEADZONE EXISTS INSIDE WHICH INTERCEPTS CANNOT OCCUR
AAW MISSILES REQUIRE ONE SHIPBOARD ILLUMINATOR PER ASCM UNTIL
INTERCEPT (TWO MISSILES LAUNCHED AT EACH ASCM)
PDG IS A STAND-ALONE SYSTEM WITH DELAYS, FIELD-OF-FIRE AND
SEQUENTIAL ASCM ENGAGEMENT LIMITATIONS
SSW MISSILES, CANISTER-LAUNCHED AND AUTONOMOUSLY-GUIDED, AVOID
LAUNCHER/ILLUMINATION RESTRICTIONS


*NO (SOFT KILL) ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSETS ARE CONSIDERED.

LAUNCHER, ILLUMINATOR, AND PDG FIELD-OF-FIRE ZONES

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L = LAUNCHER
I = ILLUMINATOR
G = PDG



IN THIS AND ALL OTHER FIGURES
DEPICTING THREAT ENGAGEMENTS,
THE SHIP TRAVEL IS ALWAYS ASSU-
MED TO BE FROM LEFT TO RIGHT.

CAPABILITY (LAUNCHER/ILLUMINATOR) PAIR SCHEDULING

- COVERAGE OFFERED BY (L/I) PAIRS FOR DDG-47

R-51472

ZONES COVERED

(L_i/I_j) PAIRS

	A	B	C	D	E
L ₁ /I ₁	X	X			
L ₁ /I ₂	X				X
L ₁ /I ₃		X			X
L ₁ /I ₄		X			X
L ₂ /I ₁		X	X		
L ₂ /I ₂				X	X
L ₂ /I ₃		X	X	X	X
L ₂ /I ₄		X	X	X	X

- WHEN A PAIR BECOMES AVAILABLE, CONSIDER ASSIGNMENTS TO THREATS IN ZONES COVERED

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WEAPON SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS

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TASKS FOR ALL SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS

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- GIVE A PRIORITY TO EACH THREAT AS IT "APPEARS"^{*}
- ASSESS RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
- ESTABLISH A SCHEDULE FOR RESOURCE USE
- REPEAT THIS PROCESS FOR EACH NEW THREAT, ATTEMPTING (THROUGH SOME POLICY OR OPTIMIZATION CRITERION) TO PROTECT THE SYSTEM AGAINST SATURATION DUE TO UNFORSEEN EVENTS

^{*}i.e., IS DETECTED, TRACKED, AND ASSESSED AS A THREAT.

SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS EVALUATED

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- SUBOPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

HIGHEST-PRIORITY-BASED POLICY: FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVED
USE-RESOURCES-WHEN-AVAILABLE POLICY: ACTIVE RESOURCE

- OPTIMIZING SEARCH OVER ALTERNATIVE SCHEDULES: BRANCH
AND BOUND

FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVED (FCFS)

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- RANK THREATS IN ORDER OF INCREASING ESTIMATED TIME-TO-GO FOR ARRIVAL AT SHIP
- FOR EACH THREAT PROCEEDING DOWN THE LIST, ASSIGN THE NEXT AVAILABLE LAUNCHER/ILLUMINATOR PAIR^{*}
- RESCHEDULE WHENEVER A NEW THREAT APPEARS

^{*}PRIORITY IN (L/I) PAIR ASSIGNMENT GOES TO TARGETS WITH LESSER TIME-TO-GO, THOUGH OTHERS MAY BE ENGAGEABLE AT EARLIER TIMES.

ACTIVE RESOURCE (AR)

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- AS WITH FCFS, RANK THREATS IN ORDER OF INCREASING TIME-TO-GO
- UNLIKE FCFS, ATTACK THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THREAT WHICH CAN BE ENGAGED BY ANY AVAILABLE (L/I) PAIR^{*}
- RESCHEDULE FOR NEW THREATS

^{*}E.G., DO NOT WAIT TO FIRE UNTIL THE TOP PRIORITY THREAT CAN BE ENGAGED.

BRANCH AND BOUND (BAB) SCHEDULING

R-70926

- PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

SEEK MINIMUM NUMBER OF ASCM LEAKERS IN PDG BLIND ZONES

ATTEMPT TO TIME-SPACE LEAKERS NOT IN BLIND ZONES SO THAT PDG CAN ENGAGE THEM


MAXIMIZE THE MINIMUM TIME-TO-GO ANY NON-LEAKER HAS BEFORE BEING DESTROYED

BRANCH AND BOUND (BAB) SCHEDULING (Cont.)

- MOTIVATION FOR MAXIMIN CRITERION

TENDS TO MAXIMIZE THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR A SECOND ATTACK ON THE THREAT,
IF NEEDED.

PERMITS MORE TIME TO RESPOND TO NEW THREATS



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PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS FOR REALISTIC SCENARIOS

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PRINCIPAL THREAT/DEFENSE PARAMETERS ASSUMED

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
PARAMETER	VALUE
Threat designation: speed	SSW/OW ₁ : 1000 f/sec
	SSW/OW ₂ : 2000 f/sec
	SSWW: 2000 f/sec
	HFD: 2000 f/sec
	DS: 1900 f/sec
	UAO: 1300 f/sec
	FSSWW ₁ : 2200 f/sec
	FSSWW ₂ : 2800 f/sec
	FHFD: 2600 f/sec
AAW missile speed	2000 f/sec
" " boost lag	1 sec
" " launcher reload time	8 sec
PDG threat engagement interval	12 sec

ALL MOTIONS ARE VIEWED AS HORIZONTAL PLANE PROJECTIONS

SIMPLE ATTACK: ALL THREATS FROM SAME DIRECTION

- SCENARIO B - SECOND ATTACK (ALL ALGORITHMS)
- ALL ALGORITHMS GIVE SAME RESULTS

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PERFORMANCE AGAINST UP TO TWO SIMULTANEOUS THREATS FOR ONE LAUNCHER

R-70942

THREAT NAME	SPEED (ft/sec)	OPEN FIRE RANGE (thousands of feet)	TIME-TO-GO/RANGE-TO-GO	
			(sec)	(thousands of feet)
			1ST THREAT	2ND THREAT
SSW/OW ₁	1000	48	31.3/31.3	26/26
SSW/OW ₂	2000	36	8.5/17	4.5/9*
SSW	2000	36	8.5/17	4.5/9*
HFD	2000	65	15.8/31.5	11.8/23.5
DS	1900	37.2	9.5/18.1	5.4/10.3
UAO	1300	77	35.3/45.9	30.4/39.6
FSSW ₁	2200	33.6	6.8/15.0	3.0/6.6*
FFSSW ₂	2800	26.4	3.5/9.8*	0.2/0.5*
FHFD	2600	83.1	13.5/35	10.0/26.0


* Inside dead zone.

- IDENTICAL PERFORMANCE FOR ALL SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS
- LAUNCHER DELAY IS CRITICAL AGAINST HIGH SPEED ASCMs
- FSSW₂ ALWAYS ELUDES AAW MISSILE DEFENSE

MORE COMPLEX CASE: THREATS TIME-CLUSTERED IN DIFFERENT ZONES

- SCENARIO D (ALL ALGORITHMS)
- ALL ALGORITHMS GIVE SAME RESULTS


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SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES GIVE DIFFERING PERFORMANCE

- ENGAGEMENT MODEL I (FCFS ALGORITHM)
- THREE LEAKERS


R-64001



SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES GIVE DIFFERING PERFORMANCE (Cont.)

R-44002

- ENGAGEMENT MODEL I (AR ALGORITHM)
- TWO LEAKERS




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SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES GIVE DIFFERING PERFORMANCE (Cont.)

- ENGAGEMENT MODEL I (BAB ALGORITHM)
- NO LEAKERS

R-64000



COMPARISON SUMMARY FOR TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES

R-70943

<u>ALGORITHM</u>	<u>NO. LEAKERS</u>	<u>NO. PDG LEAKERS*</u>	<u>"CLOSEST" NON LEAKER</u>	<u>NO. NON-LEAKERS INSIDE TWO DEAD-ZONE RADII</u>
FCFS	3	2	5 sec	7
AR	2	2	6 sec	5
BAB	0	0	7 sec	5

- OBSERVATIONS

ONLY BAB PREVENTS ALL LEAKERS


PDG LEAKERS FOR FCFS AND AR ARRIVE IN A PDG BLIND ZONE

* PDG LEAKERS ELUDE THE PDG INNER DEFENSE AND HIT THE SHIP.

SECOND CASE OF TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES

- REWORK OF ENGAGEMENT MODEL I FOR TWO THREAT TYPES (FCFS ALGORITHM)
- ONE LEAKER


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SECOND CASE OF TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES (Cont.)

- REWORK OF ENGAGEMENT MODEL I FOR TWO THREAT TYPES (AR ALGORITHM)

R-64021




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SECOND CASE OF TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES (Cont.)

- REWORK OF ENGAGEMENT MODEL I FOR TWO THREAT TYPES (BAB ALGORITHM)
- NO LEAKERS

R-64020



SECOND COMPARISON SUMMARY FOR TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES

R-70944

<u>ALGORITHM</u>	<u>NO. LEAKERS</u>	<u>NO. PDG LEAKERS</u>	<u>"CLOSEST" NON LEAKER</u>	<u>NO. NON-LEAKERS INSIDE TWO DEAD-ZONE RADII</u>
FCFS	1	0	6 sec	10
AR	1	1	5 sec	5
BAB	0	0	6 sec	5


- **OBSERVATIONS**

AGAIN, BAB PREVENTS ALL LEAKERS
AR PERMITS A PDG LEAKER; FCFS DOES NOT

THREE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES

- TASC MODEL I (FCFS ALGORITHM)
- FOUR LEAKERS


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THREE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES (Cont.)

- TASC MODEL I (AR ALGORITHM)
- THREE LEAKERS

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


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THREE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES (Cont.)

- TASC MODEL I (BAB ALGORITHM)
- THREE LEAKERS

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COMPARISON SUMMARY FOR THREE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACTIVE ZONES

R-70945

<u>ALGORITHM</u>	<u>NO. LEAKERS</u>	<u>NO. PDG LEAKERS</u>	<u>"CLOSEST" NON LEAKER</u>	<u>NO. NON-LEAKERS INSIDE TWO DEAD-ZONE RADII</u>
FCFS	4	3	11 sec	7
AR	3	2	12 sec	6
BAB	3	1	12 sec	6

- **OBSERVATIONS**

BAB ALLOWS ONLY ONE PDG LEAKER; TWO OTHER LEAKERS ARE SEPARATED IN TIME SO THAT PDG CAN ENGAGE THEM

OTHER ALGORITHMS ALLOW MORE PDG LEAKERS; FCFS PERMITS TWO LEAKERS OUTSIDE THE PDG BLIND ZONES BUT THE SECOND ONE IS TOO CLOSE IN TIME FOR ENGAGEMENT

SURFACE PLATFORM KILL WITH AAW MISSILES

R-70946

- SCENARIO

THREE EQUIDISTANT PLATFORMS APPEAR AT 54,000 FEET
RANGE AND APPROACH AT 54 F/SEC* TO LAUNCH ASCMs

ALL PLATFORMS MUST BE KILLED WITHIN 90 SEC FROM THEIR
APPEARANCE, CORRESPONDING TO 910 SEC PLATFORM TIME-TO-GO


- DEFENSE MUST KILL EACH PLATFORM WITH SIX AAW MISSILES BEFORE
THREAT ASCMs CAN BE LAUNCHED

* RANGE OF 54,000 FEET AND 54 F/SEC CLOSING SPEED IMPLIES 1000 SEC PLATFORM TIME-TO-GO

SURFACE PLATFORM KILL WITH AAW MISSILES (Cont.)

- ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THREAT PLATFORMS BEFORE ASCM LAUNCH (FCFS AND AR ALGORITHMS)
- USE AAW MISSILES IN SSW MODE


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SURFACE PLATFORM KILL WITH AAW MISSILES (Cont.)

- ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THREAT PLATFORMS BEFORE ASCM LAUNCH (BAB ALGORITHM)

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COMPARISON SUMMARY FOR SURFACE PLATFORM KILL


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- EACH ALGORITHM KILLS ALL THREATS BEFORE ASCMs CAN BE LAUNCHED

- BAB OFFERS A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE OTHERS (MIDDLE PLATFORM IS KILLED 7.7 SEC EARLIER)

AN APPROACH TO THE GENERAL ANTI-PLATFORM PROBLEM (USING AAW AND SSW ASSETS)

R-61825



* FUTURE WORK SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THESE TYPES OF ISSUES.

PRELIMINARY COMPUTATION LOAD ASSESSMENT

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- PROCESSOR USED

IBM SYSTEM 370 COMPUTER

PROGRAMMED IN APL LANGUAGE (SLOW, WITH MUCH OVERHEAD)

- CURRENT RESULTS

FCFS AND AR ASSIGNMENT POLICIES REQUIRE 0.025 SEC PER
SCHEDULE

BAB OPTIMAL SEARCH TYPICALLY REQUIRES 0.1 - 1.0 SEC PER
SCHEDULE, WITH AN EXTREME CASE OF 30 SEC

- FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE BAB COMPUTATION LOAD

SPECIAL-PURPOSE COMPUTER/SOFTWARE COULD CUT TIMES BY
100:1

RESTRICTING SEARCH SCOPE AND DEPTH RADICALLY REDUCES SIZE
OF TREE TO BE SEARCHED, PERHAPS WITH SMALL PERFORMANCE
PENALTY

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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CONCLUSIONS

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- THREE ALGORITHMS WERE DEVELOPED AND STUDIED UNDER REALISTIC SCENARIOS
- HARDWARE RESTRICTIONS (LAUNCHER DELAYS, ILLUMINATOR AVAILABILITY, ETC.) ARE CRUCIAL FACTORS, LIMITING ALL ALGORITHM PERFORMANCES, PARTICULARLY AGAINST SOME ASCMs
- IN RELATIVELY BENIGN SCENARIOS ALL ALGORITHMS BEHAVE THE SAME
- IN STRESSFUL SCENARIOS BAB CAN SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE SHIP SURVIVAL

PROTECTS SHIP AGAINST PDG CIRCUMVENTION BY LEAKERS TOO CLOSELY SPACED IN TIME OR APPROACHING IN PDG BLIND ZONES

LEAKERS ARE REDUCED 32% COMPARED TO FCFS AND 25% COMPARED TO AR ALGORITHMS
- SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY APPLIED AGAINST SURFACE PLATFORMS
- DEDICATED PROCESSORS/SOFTWARE SHOULD PERMIT REAL-TIME COMPUTATION FOR BAB ALGORITHM IN SHIPBOARD APPLICATION

RECOMMENDATIONS

R-70951

- SCHEDULE OPTIMIZATION STUDIES SHOULD BE EXPANDED:
 - INCREASE BAB OPTIMIZATION EFFECTIVENESS
 - SCHEDULE WITH VARIABLE THREAT WEIGHTS
 - INTERFACE WITH NTDS FOR EARLIER THREAT WARNING
 - CONSIDER SCHEDULING PROBLEMS OF LOWER-DEFENSE-CAPABILITY SHIPS (SUCH AS THE O.H. PERRY CLASS OF FRIGATES)
 - ADDRESS AREA DEFENSE
- COMPUTATION CONTROL VIA DEDICATED COMPUTER HARDWARE/SOFTWARE SHOULD BE PURSUED
- ANTI-PLATFORM MISSION MERITS FURTHER STUDY (REDUCE THE NUMBER OF THREAT ASCMs LAUNCHED)